北大经院工作坊第1312场
Unobserved Auctions
微观理论经济学工作坊
主讲人：Li Hao（Professor at the University of British Columbia）
主持老师：
（北大经院）吴泽南、石凡奇
（北大国发院）胡岠
参与老师：
（北大经院）胡涛
（北大国发院）汪浩、邢亦青
（北大光华）翁翕、刘烁
时间：2026年6月18日（周四）10:30-12:00
地点：北京大学经济学院305会议室
主讲人简介：
Li Hao graduated from Peking University with Mechanical Engineering degree in 1988, and received his economics PhD degree in 1995. His first academic job was assistant professor at the University of Hong Kong from 1996 to 1999. His second main academic job was at the University of Toronto, assistant professor from 2000 to 2002, associate professor from 2002 to 2004, and full professor from 2004 to 2009. He has been a full professor at the University of British Columbia from 2009.
摘要：
We study an independent private values environment in which the seller uses an algorithm to target take-it-or-leave-it offers to ex ante identical individual buyers based on publicly observable messages they send. Buyers have rational expectations about the relationship between the offers they receive and their messages, but otherwise do not observe the seller’s algorithm, while the seller’s algorithm maximizes expected revenue conditional on buyers’ messages. For any finite set of offers with the lowest equal to Myerson’s (1981) optimal reserve price, we construct equilibria in which the sellers offers are given by this set, and provide tight bounds on the seller’s revenue across all equilibria. We construct an equilibrium the seller makes all offers above the optimal reserve price and achieves the highest revenue, which converges to the optimal reserve price as the number of buyers becomes arbitrarily large.
供稿：科研与博士后办公室
美编：初夏
责编：度量、雨禾、雨田
